Addresses
Every contract this product reads, settles through, or deliberately refuses to touch — with the call that established it. Nothing here was taken from a directory, because on this chain the directory is wrong.
Chain 4663 · measured at block 57,600,352 · 2026-09-08
Live · 13
Each of these was proved by asking a contract something only the real one could answer: a router's own factory(), a position manager's own poolManager(), a codehash.
Occupied by something else · 3
All 3 hold the same 2,109-byte contract. It is a funds forwarder, and its fallback swallows every call — so getPool() SUCCEEDS and returns empty data. A client checking for a revert sees no error, decodes the zero address, and concludes there is no pool. That is worse than a missing contract, which at least announces itself.
Never deployed · 1
Code size zero and a zero codehash, which is stronger than empty: the account has never been touched on this chain.
Two routers with byte-identical code. One at Uniswap’s canonical address, one at an address nobody publishes. They differ in a single immutable: the PoolManager each names. The canonical one names an account that has never existed here, so every v4 command sent through it addresses nothing — silently, because there is no contract to revert.
Cross settles through the V3 SwapRouter02 above. It quotes v4 as well, and where the deepest fill is a v4 pool it says so and declines rather than routing you somewhere worse without mentioning it.